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I. INTRODUCTION
The days of college juniors and seniors leading their basketball team to
the Final Four and then being selected as a top pick in the National Basketball
Association (NBA) yearly amateur draft are all but over. In 2004, there were
only two seniors taken in the first ten picks of the first round of the NBA's
draft.' Before the summer of 2005, high school seniors were more likely to be
taken in the first round of the NBA draft than college seniors.2 This trend led
sports writers to dream what the world of college basketball would be like if this
was not the case. For example, in November 2003, an article in Sports Illus-
trated entitled Dream Teams read, "[a]s you can tell by the cover of this maga-
zine (Ohio State freshman LeBron James,3 in vintage naval captain's uniform,
peering through handheld telescope), we think the scarlet-and-gray are the best
college basketball team on land or sea."4 The article goes on to imagine
"[c]ollege basketball is, at this very moment, at the apex of its Golden Age...
[tihank goodness no player has left early, or skipped college altogether, since
Moses Malone went from prep to pro in 1974.',5
The mass exodus of sensational high school athletes and college under-
classman into the NBA during the late 1990's and up until the summer of 2005
was permissible as a result of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Haywood v. National Basketball Association.6 This decision held that the
NBA's rule that an individual "shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a
Player [in the NBA] until four years after... his original high school class has
I Chad Ford, Round I Analysis, http:lsports.espn.go.comlnbaldraft2OO4/columnsl
story?columnist=fordchad&id= 1827411 (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (on file with author).
2 Id.
3 In 2003, LeBron James was drafted by the Cleveland Cavaliers straight out of high school at
eighteen years of age. Player Profile, ESPN.com, http://sports.espn.go.con/nbalplayers/profile
?statsld=3704 (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). He is now one of the best players in the NBA and re-
cently started for the Eastern Conference in the NBA All-Star Game in 2006. Id.
4 Steve Rushin, Dream Teams, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 24, 2003, at 21. The article fanta-
sizes what college basketball would have been like had several superstars not left college early or
skipped it entirely. "All of these men made the right decision. The NBA will be there, as Tracy
McGrady (now in his third professional year), Kobe Bryant (in his fourth) and Kevin Garnett (in
his fifth) discovered after unforgettable college careers that are now consigned to ESPN Classic.
The 1998 title game, in which Duke's backcourt (Bryant, Trajan Langdon) was overwhelmed in
overtime by Michigan's frontcourt (Garnett, Tractor Traylor), remains the highest-rated in his-
tory." Id.
5 Id.
6 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). The Supreme Court issued a stay on the order issued by the Ninth
Circuit allowing Spencer Haywood to play in the NBA. The Ninth Circuit had ruled that NBA
Bylaw 2.05, which would render Haywood ineligible to play in the NBA, violated the antitrust
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been graduated . . . , was a violation of antitrust law.8  Thus, Spencer
Haywood, the athlete challenging the rule, was allowed to play in the NBA.9
The Haywood court did not foresee the impact its decision would have on the
future of the NBA. This is evident by the court's statement, "[tihere is no evi-
dence that the granting of the relief requested [eligibility] by cross-claimant
[Haywood] will open the door to other allegedly ineligible college basketball
players being recruited by NBA teams."' 0 Thirty-three years later, the evidence
is overwhelming. In the 2004 NBA draft, seventeen of the top twenty draft
picks would have been ineligible for the draft under the NBA's rule in 1971."
Even though early entry by star athletes has produced some phenomenal basket-
ball players such as LeBron James and Carmelo Anthony, basketball journalists
have commented, "[flor every LeBron James, there are five Ndudi Ebis, Dorell
Wrights and J.R. Smiths-talented young athletes who need wisdom and experi-
ence but are stashed away quietly on the end of benches around the league."'
12
Some have even argued that the massive influx of under-developed players has
contributed to the decline of both the popularity of professional basketball and
the quality of play.'
3
However, the NBA took a step in the right direction in the summer of
2005 when it collectively bargained with the National Basketball Players Asso-
ciation (NBPA) to put a new eligibility restriction on players entering the
league. 14 This decision, endorsed by both league Commissioner David Stem
and various veteran players,' 5 no longer allows high school seniors to enter the
NBA draft.' 6 This Note suggests that the groundwork for the NBA's new eligi-
bility requirement was laid because of Maurice Clarett's antitrust suit against the
National Football League (NFL) in 2004. The NFL would have faced the same
7 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1055 (quoting NBA Bylaw 2.05).
8 Id. at 1057.
9 Id. at 1058.
10 Id.
"1 Ford, supra note 1. Nine of the top twenty first round draft picks were directly out of high
school and only eight of the top twenty were juniors or seniors. Id.
12 Steve Kerr, A Push for NBA Change, Yahoo! Sports, Dec. 7, 2004, http://sports.yahoo.com/
nba/news?slug=skplayerdevelopl20704&prov=yhoo&type=lgns (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
13 Cf. Chris Mannix, Adults Only; David Stern Wants Teens Out of the NBA, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 2, 2005, at 15.
14 National Basketball Players Association, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement Art. X:
Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/article-X.php
[hereinafter NBA CBA].
15 Tim Povtak, NBA Age Limits May Follow NFL Rulings Some Antitrust Experts Say The
NBAPA Just Needs to Approve the Restrictions, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 2004, at D1.
16 NBA CBA, supra note 14.
2006]
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scenario as the NBA and its influx of high school players had the Second Circuit
not struck down Clarett's challenge to the NFL Player Eligibility Rule.
1 7
Following a superb freshman campaign at The Ohio State University,
which included leading the Buckeyes to a National Championship victory over
the Miami Hurricanes in the Fiesta Bowl, 18 Clarett was suspended in September
2003 for the entire 2003-04 season.' 9 After Clarett received word of his sus-
pension, and realized that he had limited options to play competitive football, he
challenged the NFL's Eligibility Rule by filing suit in the Southern District of
New York hoping to enter the 2004 draft in contravention of the NFL's rule.2°
Even though, according to the NFL Bylaws, eligibility for the NFL draft re-
quires that "at least three NFL seasons must have elapsed since the player was
graduated from high school,' the Southern District of New York ruled in
Clarett's favor.22 The NFL appealed, and the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the NFL's Eligibility Rule was exempt from antitrust litigation.23 Because
of the Second Circuit's decision, the NFL will continue to only allow athletes
who have completed their junior, senior, or red-shirt sophomore season in col-
lege to enter the draft. The court's ruling allowed the NFL to avoid the potential
jump of athletes from high school to the NFL, which was previously a trend in
the NBA.
Following the Clarett decision, the NBA implemented a new eligibility
rule requiring players entering the NBA draft to be both nineteen years old and
at least one year removed from their high school graduation.24 This Note argues
that, while the one-year-removed requirement is a step in the right direction, the
NBA would be better served by modeling its eligibility requirements after the
NFL because such a rule would lead to better quality of play, an increase in the
players' and the league's marketability, players that are mentally and physically
25more mature, and the promotion of a more respectable image. Further, this
Note points out that, because the NBA recognized the weaknesses in the NFL's
defense against Clarett, the league and the NBPA specifically incorporated the
17 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Clarett I), rev'd
in part, vacated in part, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (Clarett II), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1728
(2005).
18 Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 387. See generally ESPN.com, Clarett Finds Way to Hurt
'Canes in Clutch (Jan. 4, 2003), http://espn.go.com/ncf/bowls02/s/fiestaclarettclucth.html.
19 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 388. See generally Rusty Miller, Clarett Suspended for 2003
for 16 NCAA Violations, (Sept. 10, 2003), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college
/football/bigten/2003-09-10-clarett-suspensionx.htm.
20 Mike Freeman, Citing Antitrust, Clarett Sues N.F.L To Enter Its Draft, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
24, 2003, at D5.
21 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 127.
22 Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11.
23 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 143.
24 NBA CBA, supra note 14.
25 See infra Part VI.
[Vol. 108
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new eligibility requirement into its CBA. Because the requirement is incorpo-
rated into the new CBA, it will effectively withstand an ineligible player's chal-
lenge. 6
Because such a challenge would be modeled after Clarett's suit against
the NFL, Part II of this Note provides an overview of applicable antitrust and
labor law. Part III then describes the current eligibility requirements for both
the NFL and the NBA. Specifically, this Note focuses on the NFL provisions
that gave rise to Clarett's case, and the NBA provisions that may be challenged
in the future. Part IV gives a synopsis of the Clarett case and argues that the
Second Circuit was correct in its ruling that the Mackey test does not effectively
accommodate the collective bargaining process. Additionally, Part V analyzes
what would happen if a basketball player who does not meet the NBA's eligibil-
ity requirements attempted to challenge that provision, and concludes that such
a challenge would fail, regardless of what test the court applied. Part VI argues
that instead of the NBA implementing a one-year out of high school eligibility
requirement, it should have mirrored its eligibility requirement after the NFL's
because it would acquire more fan interest and result in a better quality product.
Finally, Part VII contains concluding remarks and recommendations concerning
the policy governing both the NBA's and the NFL's eligibility requirements.
II. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE ANTITRUST LAW
A. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act was enacted to prohibit unreasonable restraints on
27trade and commerce. Congress passed the Act in order to "curb abuses of
economic power by major industrial 'trusts' and railroad companies. 28 The
Supreme Court has stated that the Act is "a comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade., 2 9 Because of Congress's broad language, the Act has forced courts to
determine its application. 30 Section One "declares illegal every contact, combi-
nation or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states.",31 To establish a Section One violation, a party must establish: "(1) con-
certed action between the defendant and a third party, (2) restraint on trade, and
(3) an effect on interstate or foreign commerce. 32 There are two ways for a
26 See infra Part V.
27 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also Mark C. Anderson, Self-Regulation and League Rules Under
the Sherman Act, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 125, 126-27 (2002).
28 Anderson, supra note 27, at 126-27.
29 Id. (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
30 Id. (citing JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.02 (2001)).
31 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
32 Anderson, supra note 27, at 128 (citing 1 SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 (4th ed. 1997)).
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court to determine if an agreement is an unreasonable restraint on trade: the per
se rule and the rule of reason.33 The per se rule holds some agreements to be
"illegal per se" because the agreements violate antitrust laws regardless of their
justification.34 Contrary to the per se rule, the rule of reason balances whether
the challenged agreement promotes or suppresses competition by weighing all
relevant circumstances to determine if the challenged practice should be prohib-
ited.35 If the benefits of the restriction outweigh the restraints on trade, a court
will allow the restraint.36 As is the case with most legal doctrines, the courts
have carved out two categories of exemptions to Section One of the Sherman
Act: the statutory and nonstatutory exemptions.37
B. Nonstatutory Exemption
The nonstatutory exemption excuses an enterprise from antitrust liabil-
ity and can be inferred "from federal labor statutes, which set forth a national
labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining; which require good-
faith bargaining over wages, hours, and working conditions .... ,,3 The pur-
pose of the exemption is to "prevent the courts from usurping the [National La-
bor Relations Board]'s function of 'determining what is or is not a 'reasonable'
practice. ' '" '39 The exemption is supposed "to allow meaningful collective bar-
gaining to take place" by allowing some restraints placed on competition to be
free from antitrust scrutiny.4°
The Supreme Court has never actually articulated the precise boundaries
surrounding the nonstatutory exemption, but the Court tends to permit antitrust
scrutiny in spite of any resulting detriment to labor policies if the detriment fa-
vors collective bargaining.41 The first case in which the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the nonstatutory exemption was Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, Inter-
33 Id.
34 Thomas Lombardi, Can't We Play Too?: The Legality of Excluding Preparatory Players
from the NBA, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 32, 34 (2002). Examples of practices considered "ille-
gal per se" are group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
37 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League II, 369 F.3d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2004). Professional sports
deal mostly with the nonstatutory exemption, thus a detailed discussion of the statutory exemption
is outside the scope of this Note. In Clarett, the NFL did not rely on the statutory exemption
because it does not provide any protection for "concerted action or agreements between unions
and nonlabor parties." Id. at 130 n.l 1. (quoting Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975)).
38 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).





West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss3/13
THE REBIRTH OF THE NBA - WELL, ALMOST
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.42 In Allen Bradley, the Court held
that the nonstatutory exemption did not apply where unions "combine with em-
ployers and with manufacturers of goods to restrain competition in, and to mo-
nopolize the marketing of, such goods. 43 Expanding on the holding in Allen
Bradley, the Court in United Mine Workers v. Pennington4 held that while "a
union may make wage agreements with a multi-employer bargaining unit and
may in pursuance of its own union interests seek to obtain the same terms from
other employers" without incurring antitrust liability, "a union forfeits its ex-
emption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with
one set of employers to impose certain wage scale on other bargaining units. 45
The Supreme Court discussed the nonstatutory exemption again in Lo-
cal No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea
Co.,46 where it held that an hours restriction fell within the nonstatutory exemp-
tion,47 but the Court did not agree as to the reason for applying the exemption.48
Justice White felt the court should undertake a balancing approach, 49 while Jus-
tice Goldberg felt virtually all collective bargaining activity is exempt from anti-
trust scrutiny. 50 Finally, in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfit-
ters Local Union No. 100,51 the Court held the nonstatutory exemption did not
apply because this restraint was the "kind of direct restraint on the business
market[, which] has substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and poten-
tial, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over
wages and working conditions. 52 Before this Note discusses how both the fed-
42 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
43 Id. at 798. In Allen Bradley, the plaintiffs were manufacturers of electrical equipment and
conducted business mostly out of New York. Id. The defendant was a labor union that had its
jurisdiction only over New York and was thus unable to have collective bargaining agreements
with other unions. Id. at 799.
44 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
45 Id. at 665.
46 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
47 Id. at 690.
48 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League II, 369 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2004) (analyzing Jewel Tea,
381 U.S. at 676).
49 Id. (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690). Specifically, Justice White took the position "that
the application of the nonstatutory exemption should be determined by balancing the 'interests of
union members' served by the restraint against 'its relative impact on the product market."' Id.
(citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.).
50 Justice Goldberg found that the balancing approach was not necessary, and argued "all
collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under the [labor laws]
is not subject to the antitrust laws." Clarett, 369 F.3d at 132 (citing Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 710
(Goldberg, J., concurring).
51 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
52 Id. at 625. The agreement that was the subject of litigation was a union agreement with a
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eral district court and the Second Circuit attacked the nonstatutory exemption, it
is necessary to discuss how the Eighth Circuit has interpreted the exemption
because its interpretation is the key discrepancy between Clarett and the NFL,
and between the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit.
C. The Eighth Circuit's Interpretation of the Nonstatutory Exemption in
Mackey v. National Football League
In Mackey v. National Football League,53 NFL players alleged that the
Rozelle Rule 54 violated antitrust law because it restrained players' abilities to
contract services. 55 The Rozelle Rule provided that if a player's contract ex-
pired, and that player signed with a different club, the signing club must provide
compensation to the player's former team, and if the two clubs were unable to
agree on mutually satisfactory arrangements, then the Commissioner would
award the compensation as he deemed fair and equitable.56
In articulating its decision, the Eight Circuit employed a three-part test.
A restraint on trade does not receive the benefit from the nonstatutory exemp-
tion unless the restraint or restriction affects the parties to the agreement, is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, and is a product of bona fide arm's
length negotiations.57 The court in Mackey ruled in favor of the players and
held that the Rozelle Rule violated antitrust laws because the Rule was not the
product of an arm's length negotiation. 58 The court felt there was not an arm's
length negotiation because the Rozelle Rule predated the collective bargaining
relationship between the league and the union and was virtually unchanged
since its promulgation by the clubs in 1963. 59 Therefore, because the Rozelle
Rule existed before there was a collective bargaining agreement, there was no
way the two parties could have had an arm's length negotiation over the rule.
Also, the players union did not receive any benefit from the Rozelle Rule as a
quid pro quo in exchange for increased pension benefits and the right of players
to individually negotiate their compensation. 6° However, according to the Sec-
ond Circuit, the test in Mackey does not conform to the Supreme Court's most
recent treatment of the nonstatutory exemption.6'
53 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
54 The Rozelle Rule was named after the NFL's former commissioner, Alvin Ray "Pete" Ro-
zelle. Id. at 609.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 609 n. 1.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 616.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League II, 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004).
[Vol. 108
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D. The United States Supreme Court's Most Recent Treatment of the Non-
statutory Exemption: Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.
The most recent nonstatutory exemption case interpreted by the Su-
preme Court is Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.62 In Brown, there was a disagree-
ment between the NFL and the Players Association over how much money de-
velopmental players in the NFL should be paid.63 When bargaining between the
NFL Players Association and the NFL reached an impasse,64 the owners unilat-
erally implemented its terms.65 The district court allowed the case to go to a
jury, which resulted in a total of $30,349,642 in damages being awarded to the
players.66 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, construing labor laws to
"waiv[e] anti-trust liability for restraints on competition imposed through the
collective-bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate primarily in a
labor market characterized by collective bargaining., 67  The Supreme Court
picked up on this point by explaining that Congress enacted labor statutes to
prevent judicial use of antitrust law to resolve labor disputes.68 Then, the Su-
preme Court briefly discussed the nonstatutory exemption noting that "to give
effect to federal labor laws and policies and to allow meaningful collective bar-
gaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed through the bar-
gaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions., 69 However, the Su-
preme Court explained that the "collective bargaining proceeding itself must be
free of any unfair labor practice, such as an employer's failure to have bargained
in good faith. 7°
The Supreme Court held that even though most cases involved only a
single employer, multiemployer bargaining, as is the case in professional sports,
should not be treated any differently. 7' Thus, to use antitrust law to sanction
anti-competitive activities would condone behavior that the implicit labor ex-
emption seeks to avoid. 72 Based on this legal analysis, the Supreme Court af-
62 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
63 Id. at 234.
64 An impasse is a point in labor negotiations at which no agreement can be reached. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 768 (8th ed. 2004).
65 Brown, 518 U.S. at 235.
66 Id.; see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., Civ. Action No. 90-1071 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992)
(judgment on the verdict), reprinted in J.A. 2714.
67 Brown, 518 U.S. at 235 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
68 Id. at 236.
69 Id. at 237.
70 Id. at 238-39; see also Akron Novelty Mfg. Co., 224 N.L.R.B. 998, 1002 (1976).
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firmed the Court of Appeals and held that the NFL's unilateral imposition of its
terms following an impasse is exempt from antitrust scrutiny.73
E. Second Circuit Cases Construing the Nonstatutory Exemption
There have been three recent Second Circuit cases interpreting the ex-
emption: Caldwell v. American Basketball Association,74 National Basketball
Association v. Williams,75 and Wood v. National Basketball Association.76 The
facts of these cases are important because the district court distinguishes
Clarett's case from each of these, while the Second Circuit analogizes. In
Caldwell, the plaintiff player was suspended from the league because he denied
having knowledge of a missing teammate's whereabouts.77 Instead of pursuing
internal remedies in the American Basketball Association, he litigated the sus-
pension. 78 After trial, Caldwell received his full salary, but did not play profes-
sional basketball again because he was never told that his suspension had been
lifted.79 Caldwell again filed suit because he believed the league deprived him
of his opportunity to be employed as a basketball player and he was "black-
balled., 80 Caldwell based his antitrust claims on the notion that he should have
the right not to have teams that might compete for his skills collectively agree
whether or not he will be hired. 81 Because Caldwell's antitrust claims would
"subvert fundamental principles of federal labor policy," the Second Circuit
dismissed his claim because of the nonstatutory exemption.82
Similarly, in Williams, the Second Circuit held antitrust law does not
remedy a claim that addressed the players' rights to negotiate over the team they
will play for and the salary they will earn. 83 The court dismissed the plaintiff
professional basketball players' and their union's counterclaim and granted de-
claratory relief to the NBA and its member teams because "antitrust laws have
no application to the collective bargaining negotiations between appellants
[players and union] and the NBA Teams. 84 The player's claims are not in line
73 Id. at 250. The Court stated employers have four options at impasse: "(1) maintain the status
quo, (2) implement their last offer, (3) lock out their workers (and either shut down or hire tempo-
rary replacements), or (4) negotiate separate interim agreements with the union." Id. at 245.
74 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
75 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
76 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).




81 Id. at 527.
82 Id. (citing Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d. Cir. 1987)).




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss3/13
THE REBIRTH OF THE NBA - WELL, ALMOST
with the "labor laws' endorsement of multiemployer collective bargaining" and
thus must fail.85 The court explained that the nature and purpose of multiem-
ployer bargaining in the sports industry is especially important because "some
terms and conditions of employment must be the same for all teams in a sports
league. 86 Unlike "the industrial context in which many work rules can differ
from employer to employer ... sports leagues need many common rules[]" be-
cause there are several league rules that need to be bargained for by the league
and players.87
Finally, in Wood, after a player was drafted he challenged three of the
league provisions concerning the draft, the salary cap, and a limitation on player
corporations.88 The court explained, "[t]he gravamen of Wood's complaint,
namely that the NBA-NBPA collective agreement is illegal because it prevents
him from achieving his full free market value, is . . . at odds with, and destruc-
tive of, federal labor policy. ' 89  Therefore, the court rejected his antitrust
claim.90
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NFL AND NBA COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND PLAYER ELIGIBILITY RULES
The circumstances governing sports as a business are unique when com-
pared to any other employment field. The club teams that make up professional
sports leagues are "not completely independent economic competitors" because
"they depend upon a degree of cooperation for economic survival."9 1 Even
though sports leagues are unique, all professional sports, with the exception of
baseball,92 are subject to antitrust laws.93 Because the leagues must adhere to
antitrust law, the presence of collective bargaining agreements is particularly
important to the legal analysis surrounding sports cases and controversies.
A. NFL's Collective Bargaining Agreement and Player Eligibility Rule
The NFL is an "unincorporated association of thirty-two member
clubs," which essentially dominates professional football in North America.9 4
85 Id. at 688.
86 Id. at 689.
87 Id.
88 Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 956 (2d Cir. 1987).
89 Id. at 959.
90 Id. at 963.
91 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996).
92 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
93 Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
94 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The other
professional football leagues in North America are the Arena Football League, the Arena Football
League 2, the National Indoor Football League, and the Canadian Football League. Id. at 383.
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Members of the National Football League Management Council (NFLMC) rep-
resent each team, and are the "exclusive collective bargaining representative of
the League." 95 The approximately 1,400 players in the NFL are "exclusively
represented by the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA). 9 6
The NFL's first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was entered into in
1968.97 The current CBA, which took effect in 1993, is set to expire in 2007.98
The CBA and the league's Constitution and Bylaws include the rules by which
the teams select new players.99 The two provisions that are of importance to this
Note's discussion are Article Im, section 1 and Article IV, section 2.
Article 111, section 1 of the CBA states:
This Agreement represents the complete understanding of the
parties on all subjects covered herein, and there will be no
change in the terms and conditions of the Agreement without
mutual consent .... The NFLPA and the Management Council
waive all rights to bargain with one another concerning any sub-
ject covered or not covered in this Agreement for the duration
of this Agreement, including the provisions of the NFL Consti-
tution and Bylaws. 100
Article IV, section 2 of the CBA states:
Neither the NFLPA nor any of its members, agents acting on its
behalf, nor any members of its bargaining unit will sue, or sup-
port financially or administratively any suit against, the NFL or
any Club relating to the presently existing provisions of the
Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL as they are currently opera-
tive and administered.' 0 '
Because of these two provisions, there is disagreement over whether the
"NFL and the players union actually bargained over the terms of the Constitu-
tion and Bylaws (which contained the eligibility Rule at issue), or merely bar-
gained away the NFLPA's ability to bargain over or challenge the Bylaws' pro-
95 Id. at 384.
96 Id.
97 Id; see also Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part
by, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
98 Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 384.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing 11/20/03 Second Declaration of Peter Ruocco Ex. D, CBA). Peter Ruocco is the
Senior Vice-President of Labor Relations of the NFLMC and was involved in the collective bar-
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visions."'' 0 2 An essential element to Clarett's suit was whether actual bargaining
took place regarding the eligibility rule.1
0 3
When the Player Eligibility Rule was first introduced, it "precluded a
player from joining the NFL unless four seasons had elapsed since his high
school graduation."'04 However, in 1990 the requirement was adjusted so that
players who have been out of high school for three seasons may enter the
draft.'0 5 In 1993, when the current CBA became effective, the two parties ac-
knowledged that the various provisions of the 1993 Bylaws are comprehensive
rules describing who is eligible to play in the NFL.' °6 The most important rule
is the "Special Eligibility" Rule, which states that a player must receive ap-
proval from the commissioner to enter the draft if "at least three NFL seasons..
. have elapsed since the player was graduated from high school."' 1 7 Under the
2003 version of the Bylaws, the Rule now exists only as "policy and procedure"
and is omitted altogether, but NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue issued a re-
lease that virtually states the same Rule as the 1993 Special Eligibility Rule.10 8
B. NBA 's Collective Bargaining Agreement and Player Eligibility Rule
Prior to June 30, 2005 and the new NBA CBA, the NBA's player eligi-
bility rule was simply that incoming players had to be seventeen years old.' °9
Haywood v. National Basketball Association was the seminal case that inter-
preted the NBA Bylaws and governed player eligibility." 0 Prior to Haywood,
Section 2.05 of the NBA Bylaws stated: "A person who has not completed high
school or who has completed high school but has not entered college, shall not
be eligible to be drafted or to be a Player [in the NBA] until four (4) years after.
. his original high school class has been graduated ... . 1 In 1970, Spencer
Haywood signed a contract to play for the Seattle Supersonics but was ineligible
to play under Section 2.05 of the NBA's Bylaws because he was not out of high
Io2 Id. at 384-85.
103 Id. at 393.
104 Id. at 385.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 386.
108 Id. at 385. The only difference between the 1993 Special Eligibility Rule and the release by
the Commissioner was instead of being three NFL seasons removed from high school; the player
must be three college seasons removed. Id.
109 PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 76-77
(3d. ed. Supp. 2004 ed.).
110 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); see also Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management Inc., 325 F. Supp.
1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
III WEILER, supra note 109, at 76-77; see also Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1055.
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school for four years. 1 2 The district court found that Section 2.05 had the effect
of excluding him from the NBA until after the 1971-72 season." 13 Because of
this exclusion, Haywood was prevented "from contracting with any NBA team,
even though he does not desire to, or may not be eligible to, attend college and
even though he does not desire to, and is ineligible to, participate in collegiate
athletics."" 14 The district court further stated that Section 2.05 likely constituted
a group boycott1 5 and without the provision, Haywood would be permitted to
play for Seattle. ' 16 Because a player cannot negotiate with any team until four
years after his high school graduation, and even then he may only negotiate with
the NBA team that has obtained his draft rights, the district court explained that
the NBA "created an unreasonable restriction of the ability of a qualified bas-
ketball player to bargain freely," thus creating a group boycott." 7
Following the district court's ruling, the NBA appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, which stayed the injunction. 1 8 The court weighed the pros and cons of
the issue prior to and following the injunction." 19 By considering the injury to
the respective parties and that to the public interest, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court. 120 The case was then argued before the Supreme Court, which
112 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1054. In 1967, Haywood graduated high school, and after
his graduation, he attended Trinidad Junior College during the 1967-68 season. Id. at 1052. He
then played basketball for the United States in the 1968 Olympics. Id. Following the Olympics,
Haywood played for the University of Detroit for the 1968-69 season. Id. The Denver Rockets of
the American Basketball Association (ABA) signed Haywood, but because of the contract dispute
with the Rockets, Haywood signed with the Seattle Supersonics of the NBA in 1970. Id. at 1054.
This was only two and half years following his high school graduation and with full knowledge of
the NBA Bylaw 2.05. Id. at 1056. The NBA threatened to sanction Seattle for contracting with
Haywood, thus he challenged the rule. Id. at 1057.
113 Id. at 1056. Haywood would have been eligible to play in the NBA following the 1971-72
season because the required four years would have elapsed.
114 Id.
115 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). A group boycott is
considered illegal per se under Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See supra Part II.
116 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1057.
117 Id. Group boycotts are referred to as "concerted refusals to deal." See PHILLtP E. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW §2200. Under Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a group boycott is a
per se violation of the Sherman Act. Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205
(1971).
Hs Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1206.
,19 Id.
120 Id. at 1206-07. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit specifically stated:
We have considered the status quo existing prior to the District Court's action
and the disturbance of that status resulting from the injunction; the nature and
extent of injury which continuation of the injunction or its stay would cause to
the respective parties; and the public interest in the institution of professional
basketball and the orderly regulation of its affairs.
Id. at 1206. In order for a party to successfully petition the court for preliminary injunction:
[Vol. 108
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ultimately upehld the district court's preliminary injunction. 121 The Supreme
Court considered the status quo and quoted the district court when it held:
If Haywood is unable to continue to play professional basket-
ball for Seattle, he will suffer irreparable injury in that a sub-
stantial part of his playing career will have been dissipated, his
physical condition, skills and coordination will deteriorate from
lack of high-level competition, his public acceptance as a super
star will diminish to the detriment of his career, his self-esteem
and his pride will have been injured and a great injustice will be
perpetrated on him.
122
During the analysis of the injuries caused by the injunction, the district
court found there to be "no evidence that the granting of the relief requested by
cross-claimant [Haywood] will open the door to other allegedly ineligible col-
lege basketball players being recruited by NBA teams."123 Furthermore, "[n]o
monetary injury will result to the NBA by the reason of the granting of the Pre-
liminary Injunction."' 124 The court only gave this consideration of the future
impact on the NBA. Because the Eligibility Rule was not bargained for, there is
also no discussion of federal labor policy.
Before the CBA expired on June 30, 2005, the NBA's player eligibility
criterion was located in the league's Constitution and Bylaws.125 Article 11, sec-
tion 2.04 stated that in order to be eligible to enter the NBA a player must be at
least be seventeen years old.126 Section 2.05(b) stated that a person who wishes
to enter the NBA must "renounce his intercollegiate basketball eligibility by
written notice to the [National Basketball] Association at least forty-five (45)
days prior to the annual College Draft for which the person desires to be eligi-
ble." 1 7 It is also important to note that the NBA Bylaws did not constitute an
The moving party must prove: (1) there is a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) there is a substantial threat of irreparable harm; (3) the
threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the harm an injunction may cause to
defendant; and (4) the granting of the injunction would not disserve the public
interest.
Fla. Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd., v. Miami Sports and Exhibition Auth., 939 F. Supp. 855, 858
(S.D. Fla. 1996) (citing Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d 989, 992-93 n.3 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
121 Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1206-07.
122 Id. at 1205 (quoting Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1057
(C.D. Cal. 1971)).
123 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1058.
124 Id.
125 WEILER, supra note 109, at 76-77.
126 Id. Scholars argued, prior to the Clarett decision, that it is only a matter of time before a
high school underclassman, under the age of seventeen decides to challenge this provision. See
Lombardi, supra note 34, at 32.
127 Section 2.05(a) of the NBA Bylaws stated:
20061
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agreement reached through a collective bargaining process, as opposed to NFL's
Bylaws. 128
However, after that version of the CBA expired on June 30, 2005, the
NBA and the NBPA agreed to change the player eligibility requirements.'
29
Currently, the rules governing player eligibility are no longer found in the
league's Constitution and Bylaws, but are now contained in the new CBA.1
30
Article X Section 1 of the CBA states that a player is eligible for selection in the
NBA draft if the player "is or will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar
year in which the Draft is held, and ... at least one NBA Season has elapsed
since the player's graduation from high school."'
' 3 1
C. Comparison between the NFL and NBA Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments
By looking at the differences between the NFIL's and NBA's collective
bargaining agreements, it is apparent that the two leagues have achieved their
status through different bargaining methods. The fact that the NBA did not pro-
vide for or incorporate a clause similar to Article HI section 1, or Article IV
section 2 of the NFL's Bylaws was primarily the reason that the court in
Haywood does not discuss the possibility for the nonstatutory exemption.
32
These sections clearly state that the NFL and the Player's Union have negotiated
with respect to the players' eligibility. 133 Because the NBA CBA did not have a
clause similar to Article m11, section 1 or Article IV, section 2 prior to the new
CBA, the NBA allowed high school graduates and college underclassman to go
unchallenged into the NBA draft. However, using the NFL's Constitution and
Bylaws as the framework for potential change, the NBA changed its player eli-
A person who has not completed high school or who has completed high
school but has not entered college, shall not be eligible to be drafted or to be a
Player until four (4) years after he has been graduated or four (4) years after
his original high school class has been graduated .... Similarly, a person who
has entered college but is no longer enrolled shall not be eligible to be drafted
or to be a Player until the time when he would have first become eligible had
he remained in college.
WEILER, supra note 109, at 76-77. This language was the same as it was at the time Spencer
Haywood challenged the ruling. The NBA simply added subsection (b) to do away with (a).
128 Lombardi, supra note 34, at n.86 (citing Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325
F. Supp. 1049, 1059-60 (C.D. Cal. 1971)).
129 Mannix, supra note 13, at 15.
130 NBA CBA, supra note 14.
131 Id.
132 These provisions had been interpreted to mean that the parties, the NFLPA and the NFLMC,
have collectively bargained over all the provisions contained in the Bylaws. See Clarett v. Nat'l
Football League II, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
133 See supra notes 100-01.
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gibility requirement in the summer of 2005 when the CBA expired. 34 The
NBA focused on the Second Circuit's decision in Clarett v. National Football
League135 in order to establish a method of regulating player eligibility. The
NBA learned from legal issues the NFL faced in Clarett and made sure that in
its new CBA it specifically provided for a section that governs player eligibility,
not merely a reference to its Constitution and Bylaws like the NFL. This factor
will be very important if the NBA's player eligibility rule is ever challenged.
136
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: CLARETT V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
A. Factual Background Leading to Clarett's Suit Against the NFL
The infamous Maurice Clarett saga began in April 2003 when Clarett
falsified the price of items that were allegedly stolen from a Monte Carlo, which
he had borrowed during'an overnight test drive. 137 Clarett told police that $800
in cash and $300 worth of clothes were taken from his vehicle along with the car
stereo, totaling $10,000.138 Because of the astronomical cost of these items, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) investigated how Clarett, a
student athlete, could have obtained such expensive items. 139 The NCAA's in-
vestigation caused Clarett to plead guilty to failing to aid a law enforcement
officer because he admitted that he inflated the price of the merchandise taken
from his car.' 4° Next, the Ohio State University Athletic Director, Andy Geiger,
suspended Clarett for the entire 2003 season because he received "special bene-
fits" and continually misled investigators. 41  After sitting out the entire 2003
season, and not being allowed to return to the team in 2004, Clarett decided to
challenge the NFL's ruling regarding player eligibility. 42  The NFL denied
134 Kerr, supra note 12.
135 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
136 See infra Part V.
137 Rob Oiler, Eligibility Questions Send Clarett To Sidelines; Running back admits he inflated
prices of items stolen from car, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 31, 2003, at D 1.
138 Id; see also Associated Press, Court Provides a List of Cars Used by Clarett, USA TODAY,
Nov. 26, 2004, available at http:l/www.usatoday.com/sports/college/footballbigten/2004-11-26-
clarett-carsx.htm.
139 Associated Press, supra note 138.
140 Id.
141 Associated Press, Maurice Clarett Timeline, USA Today, Nov. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigten/2004-11-09-clarett-timeline.htm.
142 Id. It is interesting to note that while Clarett, after being suspended from the Ohio State
Buckeyes for the entire season, was forced to challenge the NFL's ruling, Larry Fitzgerald, a
sophomore at the University of Pittsburgh who attended prep school for a year, was allowed to
enter. Fitzgerald was arguably not eligible to enter the draft, but did not encounter any opposition
from the NFL when he made his decision. Ron Borges, Appeals Court Blocks Clarett's Bid For
the Draft, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2004, at D2. However, the NFL could have likely challenged
Fitzgerald's draft status, but chose not to. Id. Maybe if Clarett had not caused all the problems he
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Clarett the opportunity to be drafted in the 2004 NFL Draft, and Clarett brought
suit in February 2004 alleging that the eligibility rules were "an unreasonable
restraint of trade in violation" 143 of Section One of the Sherman Act'44 and Sec-
tion Four of the Clayton Act.
145
B. The Southern District Court of New York's Initial Ruling on the Field:
The NFL Violated Antitrust Law
Based on motions for summary judgment by both Clarett and the NFL,
the district court was forced to decide whether Clarett's right to seek employ-
ment in the NFL should outweigh the NFL's right "to categorically exclude a
class of players that the League has decided is not yet ready to play[.] 146 In
response to Clarett's antitrust allegations, the NFL asserted three arguments in
its defense: "(1) the [Eligibility] Rule is the result of a collective bargaining
agreement between the NFL and the players union and is therefore immune
from antitrust scrutiny; (2) Clarett has no standing under the antitrust laws to
bring this suit; and (3) the Rule is reasonable."1 47 In addressing the NFL's de-
fense of immunity from antitrust scrutiny, the district court determined that the
Second Circuit has not formulated a test that the district court should apply
when examining the nonstatutory labor exemption, but it did note that the Sixth,
did while at Ohio State, the NFL would not have challenged him then either? Writers have sug-
gested that the individual to blame for this saga is the person who stole the merchandise from
Clarett's vehicle. See David Vecsey, Close encounters of the third-year rule (September 26,
2004), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com2003/writers/david vecsey/09/26clarett.suitl.
Vecsey facetiously argues that Clarett is not to blame because he is simply "living life the Ameri-
can way, breaking the rules until you get caught. Then suing to have them changed." Id. The
individual to blame is "that sonofagun who broke into Maurice Clarett's car, without whom none
of this would have happened ... without whom Maurice Clarett is still happy as a clam playing
college ball and cruising campus in his fully loaded 2001 Monte Carlo." Id. Thus, the NFL likely
challenged Clarett's entrance because of his checkered past as opposed to a highly regarded ath-
lete like Larry Fitzgerald who slipped under the Rule because he spent a year at a prep school.
Borges, supra note 142, at D2. More evidence that suggests the NFL will only enforce the rule
when it feels necessary is found in the case of Eric Swann. Dave Anderson, Sports of The Times:
For Claren, How Early Equals How Much, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 26, 2003, at D3. Swann was picked
with the sixth pick in the first round of the 1991 draft, but had only been out of high school for
two years. Id. The NFL did not challenge Swann's eligibility because it was involved in other
legal issues with players such as Freeman McNeil and Marvin Powell. Id.
143 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League II, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).
144 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Declares illegal every contact, combination or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states.").
145 Id. § 15 ("Creates a private right of action for any person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.").




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss3/13
THE REBIRTH OF THE NBA - WELL, ALMOST
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have established a three-factored test.' 48 The three
factors articulated by the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may poten-
tially be given preeminence over the antitrust laws where the re-
straint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining relationship. Second, federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collec-
tive bargaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective bargain-
ing is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust
laws only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the
product of bonafide arm 's-length bargaining. 1
49
Following this analysis, the district court analyzed each prong of the test
and determined that the NFL's Eligibility Rule was not immune from antitrust
scrutiny. 150 The court first held that the Eligibility Rule is not "a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining" because nowhere in the rule is there a reference
to wages, hours, or conditions of employment.'15  Next, the court held that the
Eligibility Rule governs only non-employees and the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion cannot apply to those who are excluded from the bargaining unit.152 The
court stated that those who were "[n]ewcomers to an industry may not object to
provisions of collective bargaining agreements that speak to wages, hours, or
conditions of employment on the grounds that they were not present for the bar-
gaining sessions."'' 53 The court further stated that the previous Second Circuit
cases in Wood, Williams, and Caldwell held that once a player is drafted, he is
bound to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but the district court
148 Id. at 391. See Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976); Cont'l
Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393
(9th Cir. 1987); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98 (6th Cir. 1979).
149 Claret 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (emphasis added). The district court noted that the Second
Circuit acknowledged the test used by the Eighth Circuit in Mackey, but decided to apply a simple
version used by the Supreme Court in Jewel Tea, which held that the "appropriate test is 'one that
balances the conflicting policies embodied in the labor and antitrust laws, with the policies inher-
ent in labor law serving as the first point of reference."' Id. at 392 (quoting Local 210, Laborers'
Int'l Union v. Labor Relations Div. Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 844 F.2d 69, 79 (2d Cir. 1988)); see
also Local 210, 844 F.2d at 80 n.2 ("Although we believe that the agreement in the instant case
could satisfy [the Eighth Circuit's Mackey] test, we need not adopt this particular analysis. Rather,
we rely on ... Jewel Tea.").
150 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
151 Id. at 393.
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felt that Clarett's situation is different because he was not yet drafted, and thus
the nonstatutory exemption should not apply.154
Finally, the court concluded that the Eligibility Rule did not result from
arm's length negotiations because the "record is sparse in establishing the evolu-
tion of the Rule." 155 The court noted that the Eligibility Rule was adopted
shortly after the 1925 season, but the NFLPA was not formed until 1956, and
the first collective bargaining agreement was not adopted until 196 8 .156 The
court goes on to say that the references to 1993 Bylaws "demonstrate that the
union agreed not to bargain over or challenge the Rule," but "they in no way
demonstrate that the Rule itself arose from, or was agreed to during, the process
of collective bargaining."1 57 Due to these factors, the district court ruled that the
NFL was not immune from antitrust scrutiny. 158
Furthermore, the district court rejected the NFL's other defenses when it
held that Clarett had standing to sue because his injury flows from a policy that
excludes all players in his position from selling their services to the only viable
buyer. 59 The court also rejected the NFL's argument that the Eligibility Rule
would survive the rule of reason analysis when it held the NFL did not show
that the Eligibility Rule enhances competition. 60 Utilizing the test articulated in
Capital Imagining Associations. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Associations,'6 1 the
district court held that Clarett had met his burden, while the NFL failed to meet
its burden. 162 To satisfy his burden of showing a prima facie violation of Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Act, Clarett argued "[a]ge-based eligibility restrictions
in professional sports are anticompetitive because they limit competition in the
player personnel market by excluding sellers.' '163 The NFL argued that Clarett
"has not 'established the contours of the relevant market."164 The court rejected
the NFL's argument and held that "[b]ecause the Rule has the actual anticom-
154 Id. at 395-96.
155 Id. at 396.
156 Id.
157 Id. The court emphasizes that the evidence actually showed the Rule was never the subject
of collective bargaining. Id. The court makes this ruling despite evidence produced by the NFL,
in the form of a declaration by Peter Ruocco, which stated that the eligibility rule was a subject of
collective bargaining. Symposium, Panel II: Maurice Clarett's Challenge, 15 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 391, 417 (2005). Therefore, the court "rejected a factual assertion by a
witness in the case without any finding that the factual statement was for some reason inadmissi-
ble." Id.
158 Clarett 1, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 382.
161 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993).
162 Clarett , 306 F. Supp. 2d at 410.
163 Id. at 406.
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petitive effect of excluding players... it is a naked restriction."'' 65 Since Clarett
established the anticompetitive effect of the Rule, the NFL had the burden to
offer a procompetive justification. 166 The NFL offered four justifications: (1)
the protection of younger/less experienced players from injury; 167 (2) protecting
itself from losing money as a result of the injuries; 68 (3) protecting itself from
the costs of liability resulting from the injuries; 169 and (4) the protection of oth-
ers from injury and potential self-abuse.170  The court found that the league
failed to offer any legitimate procompetitive justifications for the Eligibility
Rule, and the court dismissed the NFL's argument.'
7'
Finally, the court held that even if there had been some procompetitive
justification for the Eligibility Rule, the NFL would still lose because there is an
alternative that is less prejudicial to competition. 72 The district court concluded
that Clarett's injury was "precisely the type of injury that antitrust laws were
designed to prevent"'' 73 and quoted Judge Learned Hand when he said, "antitrust
laws will not allow that which unreasonably forbids anyone to practice his call-
ing."' 174 The court then metaphorically held that the NFL's "Rule must be
sacked."' 175 However, the judges in the booth of the Second Circuit overturned
the district court's "ruling on the field."
C. The District Court's Ruling on the Field is Overturned by the Second
Circuit
Following the district court's ruling that Clarett was entitled to sum-
mary judgment, the NFL appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. 176 The Second Circuit granted the NFL's motion to stay the
district court's order because of the NFL's "likelihood of success on the merits"






170 Id. The NFL argued that if it allowed high school or young college athletes to enter the
draft, it would facilitate adolescents to over-train or use steroids "in the misguided hope of devel-
oping prematurely the strength and speed required to play in the NFL." Id.
171 Id. at 409.
172 Id. at 410. The court used the NFL's argument against itself, by stating that the League is
concerned about the physical and mental maturity of young players, but the League concedes that
this maturation "varies from individual to individual." Id. Thus, the league could easily screen
out those players that are not physically and/or mentally prepared to play in NFL. Id.
173 Id. at 406.
174 Id. at 382 (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1949)).
175 Clarett I, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
176 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League II, 369 F.3d 124, 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
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for [Clarett] and all others similarly situated.' ' 177 Clarett then applied to two
Supreme Court Justices to lift the Second Circuit's stay order. 178 Both applica-
tions were denied, and Clarett was not eligible for the 2004 NFL draft.
179
Before the Second Circuit, Clarett again argued that the NFL could not
agree that a player will not be drafted because the NFL clubs are horizontal
competitors and any such agreement would violate section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 80 Contrary to the district court however, the Second Circuit stated that his
argument failed because the NFL can act jointly in setting terms and conditions
of employment without the risk of antitrust liability.' 8' The court held that the
policy behind federal labor legislation "has long been recognized that in order to
accommodate the collective bargaining process, certain concerted activity
among and between labor and employers must be held to go beyond the reach of
the antitrust laws."'
' 82
The argument between Clarett and the NFL essentially came down to
which Supreme Court Justice's opinion in Jewel Tea the Second Circuit should
adopt. 183 The NFL argued that the Second Circuit should adopt Justice Gold-
berg's position where a balancing approach was not necessary because "all col-
lective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the [labor laws] is not subject to the antitrust laws."' 184 Clarett argued that the
court should have adopted Justice White's formulation of the exemption
whereby the court would use a balancing test to determine if the Eligibility Rule
should be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
185
The district court applied Justice White's balancing test that was
adopted by the Eight Circuit in Mackey.' 86  Addressing the Justice
White/Mackey Balancing Test, the Second Circuit stated that it did not regard
the Eighth's Circuit's decision in Mackey as defining the "appropriate limits of
177 Id. at 130. The only other college player that took advantage of the district court's ruling and
decided to enter the NFL draft was University of Southern California Wide Receiver Mike Wil-
liams. Williams lost his amateur status when he hired an agent, and thus following the Second
Circuit's decision he was unable to return to college and play for the 2004 National Champions.
See Associated Press, Williams Hires an Agent for the Second Time, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Oct.
13, 2004, at 9.




182 Id.; see also United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
183 Clarett 11, 369 F.3d at 133.
184 Id. at 132 (citing Local No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 712 (1965)).
185 Clarett 11, 369 F.3d at 133.
186 Clarett v. Nat'l Football League I, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379,405 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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the nonstatutory exemption."1 87 Furthermore, the Second Circuit disagreed with
the Eighth Circuit's reading of the Supreme Court's rulings in Connell, Jewel
Tea, Pennington, and Allen Bradley, where the Eight Circuit interpreted the
"alleged anticompetitive effect of the challenged restraint" as being on a "labor
market organized around a collective bargaining relationship.' 88 Contrary to
the Eighth Circuit, the Second Circuit felt that the Supreme Court's decisions
were of "limited assistance" to see if the player challenging the league's re-
straints on "professional sports players imposed through a collective bargaining
process."'189 These cases were of limited assistance because they involved inju-
ries to employers who stated that "they were being excluded from competition
in the product market."' 90
The Second Circuit does not address "whether the Mackey factors aptly
characterize the limits of the exemption in cases in which employers use agree-
ments with their unions to disadvantage their competitors in the product or busi-
ness market,"' 9 ' because the cases that the Second Circuit has decided are where
a "plaintiff complains of a restraint upon a unionized labor market characterized
by a collective bargaining relationship with a multi-employer bargaining
unit." 92 Furthermore, the Mackey factors are not helpful because the factors do
not "comport with the Supreme Court's most recent treatment of the nonstatu-
tory labor exemption in Brown." 193
The Second Circuit took notice of the Supreme Court's treatment of the
nonstatutory exception in Brown, but could not directly apply it because the
Supreme Court did not address the precise contours of the exemption. 94 There-
fore, the Second Circuit applied its prior decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and
Wood because these decisions fully comport with the Supreme Court's decision
in Brown. 95 Therefore, the main issue the Second Circuit needed to resolve was
if, under the Supreme Court's decision in Brown and prior Second Circuit deci-
sions, "subjecting the NFL's eligibility rules to antitrust scrutiny would 'subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy.
'196
187 Clarett 11, 369 F.3d at 133. See Local 210, 844 F.2d at 80 (declining to follow Mackey in
favor of balancing test articulated in Jewel Tea); see also U.S. Football League v. Nat'l Football
League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1372 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing Mackey is "not consistent with our
decision in Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n").
188 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 133.
189 Id. at 134.





194 Id. at 138.
195 Id.
196 Id. (quoting Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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The court began its analysis by establishing that Clarett does not have
the right to negotiate directly with the NFL teams over the terms and conditions
of his employment. 197 Rather, the NFL teams are permitted to engage in joint
conduct with respect to the terms and conditions of players' employment with-
out risking antitrust liability. 98 Clarett's argument that he was physically quali-
fied to play, and antitrust laws should stop the NFL from enforcing the Eligibil-
ity Rule, contravened the principles of the collective bargaining process and
federal labor policy. 199 Because the NFL players are unionized, and the NFLPA
is their bargaining representative, federal law bars Clarett from negotiating di-
rectly the terms and conditions of his employment. 200 The terms and conditions
of Clarett's employment are within the collective bargaining agreement, and the
NFLPA may expand or restrict the rights of those whom it represents. 20' There-
fore, so long as the provision Clarett challenged is a term and condition of em-
ployment, he should lose.
In order to succeed, Clarett needed to show that the Eligibility Rule did
not constitute a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and was not a term
and condition of employment, and thus did not fall within the protection of the
202nonstatutory exemption. Rejecting this argument, the Second Circuit felt that
the Eligibility Rule is a mandatory bargaining subject because the Eligibility
Rule is unique to professional sports in that it determines a condition for initial
employment and parties must bargain about the requirements or "condition[s]"
of "initial employment., 20 3 The Second Circuit states that the Eligibility Rule is
also a mandatory bargaining subject because it has "tangible effects on the
wages and working conditions of current NFL players." 2°  For example, the
Eligibility Rule affects the job security of veteran players because younger play-
ers may take veterans roster spots on a team due to the cap on a team s size.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 139.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 138.
201 Id. at 138-39. For example, in seeking the best deal for the NFL players overall, the NFLPA
can treat a certain category of players better than others, as long as it has a duty of fair representa-
tion. Id. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). The NFLPA is also able to favor veteran
players over rookies. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1953). The NFLPA
can also "seek to preserve jobs for current players to the detriment of new employees and the
exclusion of outsiders." See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210-15
(1964).
202 Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 139.
203 Id. at 139. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 504 (West ed.) (1976).
204 Clarett 11, 369 F.3d at 140.
205 Id. at 140; see also Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Col-
lective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L. J. 1, 16 (1971).
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Finally, Clarett argued that the rule is a violation of antitrust law be-
cause it affects individuals outside the union.2°6 But the Second Circuit re-
sponded by stating that this is similar to union demands for hiring arrangements,
and this court has held in prior case law that this was permissible.20 7 The terms
and conditions of a prospective player is for the NFLPA and the NFL to deter-
mine, and they can "agree that an employee will not be hired or considered for
employment for nearly any reason whatsoever so long as they do not violate
federal laws such as those prohibiting unfair labor practices, or discrimina-
tion. 20 8 The Second Circuit then went on to analogize this case to similar cir-
cumstances where an employer may set the requirements for hiring when it
stated "this lawsuit reflects simply a prospective employee's disagreement with
the criteria... that he must meet in order to be considered for employment,"
and the court followed the Supreme Court in declining to "fashion an antitrust
exemption [so as to give] additional advantages to professional football players.
that transport workers, coal miners, or meat packers would not enjoy.
2°9
Thus, Clarett's thrust toward the NFL draft was stopped dead in its tracks.2 1°
D. Monday Morning Quarterback: The Second Circuit was Correct in its
Holding
Following the Second Circuit's decision in Clarett, several scholarly ar-
ticles were written about whether or not the Second Circuit was correct when it
rejected the strict three prong Mackey test, and held all mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining are exempt from antitrust law. Critics argue that the Sec-
ond Circuit misconstrued the test and should have affirmed the district court's
ruling by applying the Mackey test because "the NFL already enjoy[s] unequal
bargaining power over the players union, and [the test] should serve to narrow,
not enlarge the scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption. 211 Further, the Sec-
ond Circuit's broad exemption "encourages players to decertify their unions in
order to place their player restraint claims in the realm of antitrust laws - a re-
sult that subverts the very federal labor policies the exemption purportedly up-
206 Clarett I1, 369 F.3d at 140.
207 Id. at 140-41.
208 Id. at 141.
209 Id. at 143. (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. 518 U.S. 231, 249 (1996)).
210 Following Clarett's appeal, he sat out of college football for two years, and in 2005 he ran a
sub-par 4.82 and 4.72 forty yard dash at the NFL Combine in Indianapolis. Kyle Nagel, Clarett's
Promise Now Just a Memory, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 12, 2006, at Al. However, the Denver
Broncos took a chance on Clarett and drafted him with the 101st pick of the 2005 NFL Draft. Id.
He was then cut by the Broncos before the regular season began, and was recently arrested for
aggravated robbery. Id.
211 Jocelyn Sum, Annual Review 2005: Part 11: Entertainment Law and New Media: VII. Anti-
trust Law: A. Note: Clarett v. National Football League, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807, 821 (2005).
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holds. 212 Also, critics argue that the Second Circuit impermissibly expanded
the nonstatutory exemption because it "misinterpreted distinguishable precedent
as binding" and also erred "by rejecting the test from Mackey while neverthe-
less, applying its three factors, and then misapplying those three factors to the
facts presented., 213 Additionally, some argue that the Clarett decision "fails to
afford the proper weight to federal antitrust law and policy in balancing those
interests against applicable federal labor law and policy.
214
Contrarily, other scholars persuasively argue that the Second Circuit
was correct in its analysis because the more open ended standard applied by the
court "wisely allows for more flexibility in nonstatutory exemption analysis...
,,215 Specifically, the Second Circuit's test "avoids a paramount weakness of
the Mackey framework: namely, the Eighth Circuit's formulation making de-
terminative the bona fide arm's length negotiations requirement., 21 6 Simply
stated, requiring the third prong of the Mackey test, a quid pro quo, would un-
dermine the collective bargaining process and negate the policies underlying the
nonstatutory exemption because it would be "silly" to require the two sides to sit
and argue about a provision to which the union does not object. 217 Therefore,
the test that would comport with federal labor policy and the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown, where the court held a unilateral imposition was exempt,21 8
would not include the final element in the Mackey test. If the Supreme Court
would apply the nonstatutory exemption to a rule that was not bargained for,
then it would seem obvious that the arms length bargaining prong is not neces-
sary to the exemption. If such a requirement were mandatory, employers would
be put in the "absurd position of having to insist that the union put up a formal
resistance to the employer's proposal," and unions could refuse to communicate
on some issues in hopes of leaving open the idea of later bringing an antitrust
claim. 219 Accordingly, the third prong in Mackey is superfluous, and as long as
the challenged rule or restraint is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,
the nonstatutory exemption should apply.220 To require the arms length bargain-
212 Id.
213 Michael Scheinkman, Comment: Running Out of Bounds: Over-Extending the Labor Anti-
trust Exemption in Clarett v. National Football League, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 733, 740 (2005).
214 Scott A. Freedman, Comment: An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The Second Circuit's
Blanket Application of the Non-Statututory Labor Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 155, 156 (2004).
215 Recent Case: Antitrust Law-Nonstatutory Labor Exemption-Second Circuit Exempts NFL
Eligibility Rules from Antitrust Scrutiny. - Clarett v. National Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d
Cir. 2004), 118 HARV. L. REv. 1379, 1380 (2005).
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1382; Symposium, supra note 157, at 407-08.
218 Recent Case, supra note 215, at 1383 (arguing that the decision in Brown virtually renders
the third prong of the Mackey test moot).
219 Id. at 1386.
220 Id. at 1382.
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ing would be counterproductive because it is likely that the reason the union
would not sit and argue with the league is because the union does not object to
the restraint.2 21 These practical effects run contrary to the policy of allowing
meaningful bargaining to take place, therefore the aggrieved party's remedy
should lie in labor law, not in antitrust.
Moreover, there is an argument that even if the Second Circuit was
wrong in its application of the nonstatutory exemption, and the court should
have held the rule was not exempt under Mackey, the Second Circuit could have
reached its result in favor of the NFL through other means. By employing the
rule of reason analysis or a "functional, 'hybrid' antitrust-labor law" analysis,
the court should have held that "the pro-competitive effects of the three-year
rule outweigh the potentially negative effects" due to the "unique aspects of
major professional sports in the United States, and the expansive reading of the
labor exemption as utilized by many sports associations .... ,,22 The justifica-
tions for the eligibility requirement are to allow the NFL "to preserve jobs of
current union members and maintain the high level of skill in the incoming tal-
ent pool,,'223 and "by fostering the skills of incoming rookies, the NFL permissi-
bly secures the highest level of on field competition and promotes a longer pe-
riod of amateur player development." 224 Even if the NFL would not win this
argument before the court, the district court was surely wrong in granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of Clarett, and should have ordered the case to trial.225
221 Symposium, supra note 157, at 403-04. Also, labor law acknowledges that by the practice
of the parties over time, a course of conduct can emerge and become binding on the parties to a
CBA. Id. at 412 (quoting Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 199 v. United Tel. Co. of
Fla., 738 F.2d 1564, 1568 (1lth Cir. 1984)). To support this argument further, in Clarett I, the
district court actually heard evidence that supported the assertion that the eligibility requirement
was bargained for because a declaration by Peter Ruocco actually said that the eligibility rule was
in fact a subject of collective bargaining. Symposium, supra note 157, at 417. Thus, there is an
argument that the judge incorrectly granted the motion for summary judgment when she decided a
factual issue. Id.
222 Peter Altman, Note: Stay Out for Three Years After High School or Play in Canada - And
for Good Reason: An Antitrust Look at Clarett v. National Football League, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
569, 572 (2004). Other scholars argue that even if the rule of reason analysis was applied, the
League (NFL or NBA) should argue that the rule of reason would allow an age-based Eligibility
Rule because an age-limitation allows teams to spend more time evaluating the talent of potential
draftees; thus, clubs are not wasting valuable money on raw and underdeveloped talent and can
field a more exciting team, which would lead to more ticket sales and revenue. Justin Mann
Ganderson, With The First Pick In The 2004 NFL Draft, The San Diego Chargers Select... ?: A
Rule of Reason Analysis Of What the National Football League Should Have Argued In Regards
To A Challenge Of Its Special Draft Eligibility Rules Under Section 1 of The Sherman Act, 12 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 1, 25 (2004).
223 Altman, supra note 222, at 603.
224 Id. at 603-04.
225 Symposium, supra note 157, 407-08. Professor Roberts from Tulane University stated that
for a judge to grant summary judgment on the rule of reason analysis as it applied to the eligibility
rule is "goofy." Id. Surely, reasonable minds could differ as to whether or not the eligibility
requirement is reasonable given the violent nature of professional football.
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V. A CHALLENGE TO NBA'S ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT
The confusion over what antitrust test should apply when a player chal-
lenges a league's eligibility requirements, and whether the eligibility require-
ment is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining is evident by both the cir-
cuit split between the Eighth and Second Circuits and the various arguments
proposed by academics on both sides. However, when the NBA included its
eligibility requirement into its 2005 CBA, the conflict over what nonstatutory
exemption test to apply will likely not be determined in the near future. Be-
cause of the different tests applied, the precise scope of the nonstatutory exemp-
tion would be an excellent question for the Supreme Court to decide.226 Ideally,
it would be nice for the issue to arise before the Court under the context of a
sports eligibility requirement. The NBA's pre-2005 eligibility requirement
could have been an excellent case because it would have posed the same ques-
tions as Clarett.
The controversy sparked by Clarett was whether to apply the Mackey
test and its strict three prong test or simply hold all mandatory subjects of col-
lective bargaining exempt from antitrust sanctions.227 In Clarett, had the court
gone through a strict Mackey analysis, it likely would have held that the NFL
did not meet the arm's length bargaining prong of the test because the rule was
merely referenced in the NFL's Bylaws. However, the NBA would be in a
much better legal position than that of the NFL with regards to the third prong
of the Mackey test because the eligibility requirement was a hot topic at the bar-
gaining table prior to the NBA CBA being signed in the summer of 2005,228 and
because the eligibility requirement is actually contained in the CBA itself.
229
Therefore, the NBA will have no difficulty satisfying the bona fide arm's length
bargaining third prong of the Mackey test.230 Thus, because the NBA satisfied
the "bona-fide arm's length" bargaining prong of the Mackey test when it in-
cluded its eligibility requirement into its CBA, the differences between the Sec-
ond and Eighth Circuit's tests will likely not affect the outcome of the case.
Consequently, the league would satisfy both the Second and Eighth Circuit tests.
226 Recent Case, supra note 215, at 1386.
227 See supra notes 146-225 and accompanying text.
228 Potvak, supra note 15.
229 NBA CBA, supra note 14. The NBA's eligibility rule is not merely referenced as was the
case in the NFL. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
230 Also, even those who disagree with the Second Circuit's decision in Clarett will concede
that potential future NBA players are parties to the collective bargaining agreement, consequently
the first prong of the Mackey test is satisfied as well. Zimmerman v. Nat'l Football League, 632
F. Supp. 398, 405 (D.D.C. 1986); Jason Ablen, Chris Brown, & Neil Desai, Comment and
Casenote: Lingering Questions after Clarett v. NFL: A Hypothetical Consideration of Antitrust
and Sports, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 1767, 1773 (2005); Scheinkman, supra note 213, at 758; Nicholas
E. Wurth, Article: The Legality of an Age-Requirement in the National Basketball League After
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But, if an exceptional high school basketball player is either ineligible
to play at the college level for one year or simply does not think he should wait
that extra year, and wishes to enter the NBA draft immediately out of high
school, and decides to challenge the NBA's eligibility requirement, the case's
resolution may be based on whether or not the eligibility requirement is a man-
datory subject of collective bargaining. Should it side with the Second Circuit,
the NBA's eligibility requirement would undoubtedly pass its test because the
facts are virtually the same as in Clarett. But if a jurisdiction adopts the same
analysis as the district court in Clarett and several other scholars,23' the NBA
may not prove that the eligibility rule was a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. The debate over the second prong of the Mackey test, and whether
or not the eligibility requirement is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
is present in both the Second and Eighth Circuit tests. The argument that an
eligibility requirement is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining,232 is
essentially that it is not a condition of employment because conditions of em-
ployment are limited to those conditions under which one has to perform his
job.233 Second, the eligibility requirement is not intimately related to wages or
working conditions because any such relation is simply an "underlying assump-
tion" and there is no effect on veteran player job security. 2 4 However, this Note
agrees with the Second Circuit when it states that the second prong is satisfied
because the eligibility requirement is an entry requirement and such a require-
ment is intimately related to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment
similar to the conditions under which an employer may terminate an em-
ployee.23 5 While there are cases that suggest pre-employment drug tests are not
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,236 the Second Circuit has held that
hiring halls (where individuals seeking employment are referred to employers)
are mandatory subjects of bargaining.237 As discussed in more detail below, the
veteran players' and league officials' reaction to the effects of the eligibility
requirement show that it plays a vital role in the league's product and veterans'
231 See supra notes 211-14.
232 Scheinkman, supra note 213, at 759; John R. Gerba, Comment: Instant Replay: A Review of
the Case of Maurice Clarett, The Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption, and its Pro-
tection of the NFL Draft Eligibility Rule, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2383, 2414 (2005).
233 Gerba, supra note 232, at 2418.
234 Id. at 2420-23.
235 Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523, 529 (2d Cir. 1995); Symposium,
supra note 157, at 418.
236 Symposium, supra note 157, at 412 (citing Star Tribune v. Newspaper Guild of the Twin
Cities, 29 N.L.R.B. 543, 548 (1989)).
237 Id. at 398 (citing Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n., 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987)). Pro-
fessor Roberts actually states, "I don't think there is anybody on this panel-in fact, I have not
talked to anybody who is a labor lawyer-who would agree that entry requirements are not a man-
datory subject of bargaining." Id. at 402.
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salaries, thereby making the requirement intimately related to wages and other
conditions of employment.
238
VI. THE NBA'S NEW ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT IS ONLY A STEP IN THE
RIGHT DIRECTION
While the NBA's new eligibility requirement will work to help the
league produce a better quality product and attract more viewers by not allowing
high school players to enter the draft, it falls short of effectively ensuring these
results. Alternatively, the NBA's new rule should have been mirrored after the
NFL's eligibility requirements. Currently, it seems as though the NFL can do
no wrong, every aspect of the NFL keeps soaring: popularity, ratings, gate re-
ceipts, and licensing.239 College football has also increased in popularity.24
2005 saw the only two undefeated teams go head-to-head for the national cham-
pionship when the University of Texas beat the University of Southern Califor-
nia.241 Because of the excellent 2005 college football season, fans are anxiously
awaiting the arrival of superstars Matt Leinhart, Reggie Bush, and Vince
Young, all of whom are likely to be top picks in the 2006 NFL Draft.
242
Contrary to the NFL and college football, the NBA is struggling.243 The
NBA's image has not been the same since the early 1990's, when Michael Jor-
dan won championships for the Chicago Bulls and professional basketball was
going to be "The Game of the New Century." 24  Recently, fans and analysts
have begun to comment on the depreciation of the quality of the games in the
NBA.245 While there could be many causes to the NBA's struggle (such as the
expansion of the league resulting in the dilution of talent or implantation of the
zone defense),246 a glaring cause is the increase of young underdeveloped teen
238 See infra Part VI.B.
239 Abeln, et al., supra note 230, at 1769; Gregg Easterbrook, Tuesday Morning Quarterback,
NFL.coM, http://www.nfl.com/features/tmq/091305 (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
240 Pro Grid Still King, Online Survey Finds, N. Y. POST, Dec. 28, 2005, at 64 (showing that in
an online survey that college football is America's third favorite sport, behind professional foot-
ball and baseball).
241 Bill Plaschke, Trojans Discover the Enemy Within, and an Era Ends Quietly, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2006, at S 1.
242 Sam Farmer, Now It's Pick 'Em at the Top; Young's entry changes NFL draft picture, and
Bush is anything but a sure thing to go No. 1, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at SDI.
243 See Jack McCallum, The Top Five: NBA's Sinking Popularity Should Prompt Image Make-
over, SI.CoM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/writers/jack-mccallum/1 2/09/top.five (last
visited Feb. 6, 2006).
244 Id.; Easterbrook, supra note 239.
245 Kerr, supra note 12; Mannix, supra note 13, at 15; Rick Horrow, NBA at Finals Time: Sus-
taining Three Business Goals, CBS.SPORTSLINE.COM,
http://cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/6408583 (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
246 Interview of Michael McCann with Aran Smith, http://nbadraft.net/McCanninterview.asp
(last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
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247agers sitting on the bench during early stages in their career. Many of these
players were sensational athletes in high school, drafted on raw talent, but were
never heard of by the average basketball fan. The poor quality of play and
number of players that the average fan cannot identify has caused the NBA's
fans to take their money elsewhere.248 In an effort to prevent this trend from
continuing, and to improve the quality of play, Commissioner David Stem
wanted to impose a twenty-year-old eligibility requirement once the collective
bargaining agreement expired in 2005, but the union was able to negotiate a
younger limit, which only requires players entering the draft to be nineteen
years old and one year out of high school. 249 The next two subsections focus on
the NBA's implementation of the new requirement from two different perspec-
tives: first the players', then the fans' and league's.
A. From the Players' Perspective
This new eligibility requirement affects two types of players: those cur-
rently in the league and those players potentially entering the league. With the
exception of some of the current NBA players who themselves entered the
league straight out of high school, several players supported the new eligibility
requirement, citing issues of immaturity250 and the deterioration of the quality of
play as the reason.25' Veterans say, "the league has become like watching a
high school game-all dunks and turnovers. 252 An obvious reason to support the
eligibility requirements from the perspective of veteran players is that the re-
quirement may preserve their jobs from talented newcomers.253 The younger
players are forcing the older players out of the league, not because the younger
254players are better, but simply because the younger players are cheaper.
247 Easterbrook, supra note 239.
24 Mannix, supra note 13, at 15; Easterbrook, supra note 239.
249 Mark Murphy, Basketball NBA Preview 2005-06, THE BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 2, 2005, at
080.
250 See Marty Bums, Age Before Beauty: Players Young and Old Set to Give NBA Age Limit,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com2005/writers/marty-burns/03/04/
age.limit/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
251 Murphy, supra note 249.
252 id.
253 Tom Oates, Big Loss For Clarett Is Big Gain For Many, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, Apr.
23, 2004, at Al.
254 Ray Melick, What's Good For the NFL Should Be the Same for The NBA, SCRIPPS HOWARD
NEWS SERVICE, April 22, 2004, available at http://www.caller2.comlshns/story.cfm?pk=BKN-
MELICK-04-22-04&cat=BC. One may argue that even if the draft only included college juniors
and seniors, then the veterans' jobs would still be in jeopardy. This is not the case however, be-
cause the high school players and college underclassmen are being drafted on pure potential, with
full knowledge that they will not contribute substantially during their first few years in the league.
This leaves teams with a difficult choice after the rookies' initial contracts expire: sign the un-
proven player to a long term deal or let him go and watch him succeed for another team, as was
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In the past, the NBPA has fought hard against an age-limit clause in the
collective bargaining agreement.255 The reason that some players are opposed to
this age-limit is that they do not believe that the NBA should restrict an individ-
ual's right to earn a living.256 Many of the original high-school draftees have
been in the league for many years now and have become very influential. Play-
ers such as Kevin Garnett and Tracy McGrady do not support an age limitation
because they came straight into the league from high school and have been suc-
cessful. 257  Also, some older players may understand that many of the high
school kids come from poor neighborhoods, and the potential to earn even the
league minimum outweighs the NBA's interest. Furthermore, some NBA play-
ers may not want to expose the high school athletes to the NCAA because of its
strict rules and regulations.258
The other class of players affected by the eligibility requirement is the
class of potential players entering the draft. Scholar Michael McCann argues the
most notable academic position against changing the player eligibility require-
ment for the NBA.259 McCann's argument is predicated on the irrational eco
nomics of banning high school players from the NBA. 6° In his article, McCann
argues that a ban on "premiere high school players from the NBA Draft would
be irrational, both for those players and for the NBA, since those players are
self-selected and almost always exceptionally talented, and since the NBA's
economic system provides incentives for them to seek entrance into the NBA as
soon as possible., 261 His article explores "how high school players who enter
the NBA Draft are a small, self-selected group, comprised almost entirely of
exceptionally talented players. [And] Simply put, for every Korleone Young,
the case of Jermaine O'Neal. Roscoe Nance, From High School to the NBA, the Leap Can be Too
Great, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2005, at IA. Conversely, general managers and owners would be
less patient with an older college player because their "ceiling" would be lower, thereby preserv-
ing the veterans' jobs.
25 Mike Fish, NBA considers plugging flood of teen-agers with new eligibility rule, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 18, 2004, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/writers/mike-
fish/06/18/nba.age.limit/.
256 Id. Players such as Dikembe Mutumbo and Alonzo Mourning have supported the age-
limitation but Union Spokesperson Dan Wasserman has stated, "The vast majority of guys have
always been against an age limitation simply on the grounds you shouldn't restrict someone's right
to make a living." Id.
257 Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School
Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 113, 146-47 (2004).
258 Phil Taylor, Damned If You Do, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 25, 1991, at 54.
259 McCann is a highly respected author in the field of Sports and Antitrust law. After publish-
ing his article relating to the irrational economics of banning high players from the NBA Draft, he
became a member of Maurice Clarett's Legal Team against the NFL. Mark Alesia, Age-Old
Question; For NBA Draft Picks, How Young is Too Young?, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 23,
2004, at 1D.
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there are two or three Kevin Garnetts. '262 His argument is essentially that the
earlier the players arrive into the NBA, and the longer they stay, the better off
for the NBA and its fans.263 To support his argument, McCann compares the
per year salary of the average individual who enters the NBA immediately fol-
lowing high school to the average NBA player who attends college and is
drafted after college.264 He suggests that the player who enters the NBA follow-
ing high school will earn more over his lifetime than the individual who first
enters college because ideally a younger athlete will usually work longer. 65
There is no way to dispute the argument that if players stay in the
league until the normal retirement age, they will make more money quicker by
entering the draft earlier. 66 The NBA's salary structure is designed for veteran
players to earn more money over longer careers. 67 Therefore, McCann is cor-
rect in that respect. If a dynamic high school athlete were willing to forgo his
college career and possibly struggle for a few seasons in the NBA while making
millions of dollars before likely blossoming as a huge star, then it may be in his
best interest to enter the league as soon as possible. This argument, however,
overlooks the "value" of the college experience. 68 McCann argues "[w]hatever
'value' college may provide these players can, of course, be gained later in their
lives, after they have made their millions., 269 This position completely ignores
the fact that life as a college freshman at a "big time" basketball university is
drastically different than a rookie season on a sub-par NBA team.270 Therefore,
while it is true that a young athlete would be a millionaire before many recent
college graduates, one should not be so quick to shoot down the other aspects




266 One critic of McCann's theory actually says, "[i]f an NBA team hypothetically wished to
draft a 10-year old with the hopes of securing the next great basketball talent, there is no doubt
that if the phenom lives up to his potential he will earn more money than another person his age
that waits until he graduates high school before he is drafted." Wurth, supra note 230, at 133.
This Note does not agree with another statement made by Wurth. In his article, Wurth states,
"[t]he risk that a young player may ruin his life by forgoing college and declaring for the draft far
outweighs the chance that a relative few young stars may make $50 million in their career when
they otherwise may have made $70 million." Id. at 134. In this respect, this Note agrees with
McCann when he states, "even if we consider [Koreleone] Young a 'failure,' bear in mind that at
age 19, he earned $289,750 to play in the NBA, and over the past three seasons, has earned be-
tween $50,000 and $100,000 per year to live abroad and play ... basketball ... for eight months
of the year." McCann, supra note 257, at 180. Thus, the risk of "ruining" a young players life is
not substantial enough for that to be the single reason to have a higher eligibility requirement.
267 McCann, supra note 257, at 117-29 (discussion of the NBA rookie salary scale).
268 Cf. Id. at 175.
269 Id.
270 See generally Rick Reilly, Missing Persons, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 1, 2002, at 80.
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that the college experience may provide. 27' Additionally, some of the players
who fail after being drafted from high school may have lost their only chance at
a high priced college education.272
Furthermore, McCann's statement that "for every Korleone Young,
there are two or three Kevin Gametts ' '273 is arguably contradictory to the data in
his article. McCann categorizes all twenty-two high school athletes who were
drafted in the NBA from 1975-2001 as either a "superstar," "star," "service-
able," "fringe," "minor leaguer," or a "bust."2 74 Of the twenty-two players, only
four are given the grade "superstar," like Garnett, while seven players are given
either a "minor leaguer" grade as Korleone Young, or even worse, a "bust.,
275
Accordingly, if a player knows the road ahead of him and wishes to forgo the
"value" of college basketball, then economically, it would make much more
sense for him to make his millions. This Note does not agree, however, that it is
in the best interests of the fans and the league itself.
B. From the Fans' and the League's Perspective
Entering the NBA may be economically advantageous for the high
school athletes, but it is economically detrimental to both the NBA and its vet-
eran players, and is not in the league's or the fans' best interest.276 Because of
this the league should have implemented a stricter eligibility requirement. A
rule similar to the that of the NFL would have lead to better quality of play and
a more exciting product, increased both the league's and the players' market-
ability, ensured players were mentally and physically more mature, and pro-
moted a more respectable image. In McCann's article, he states that the NBA is
better served by not prohibiting high school players from entering the NBA be-
cause "most high school players who have elected to declare for the NBA draft
have done well, if not spectacularly. 277 To rebut the argument that the NBA is
suffering from a drop in popularity, McCann states that "according to Commis-
sioner David Stem, television ratings, attendance, merchandise sales, and gate
receipts [in 2003-04] are all up from the 2002-03 season., 278 However, other
numbers show that such a generalization is difficult to establish. For example,
in 2003 other reports show that "the NBA's shift to a cable deal with
271 "The mere fact that it is possible.., that a player will earn more entering the league out of
high school does not mean that the player necessarily should do so or that the league should re-
frain from allowing them to do so." Wurth, supra note 230, at 133; see also infra Part VI.B.
272 See McCann, supra note 257, at 156, for examples of two unsuccessful draftees.
273 Id. at 115.
274 Id. at 145.
275 Id. at 145-60.
276 See Melick, supra note 254.
277 McCann, supra note 257, at 178.
278 Interview of Michael McCann with Aran Smith, supra note 246.
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ESPN/ABC replacing NBC as TNT's partner has resulted in a one-third decline
in viewership to 3.5 million fans a night for the playoffs compared with 5.2 mil-
lion [in 2002].,,279 Also, the ratings for Game One of the 2005 NBA Champion-
ship showed that just less than nine percent of the homes in the nation's largest
television markets watched the game, down almost twenty five percent from the
previous year.28° While those numbers are subject to change depending on the
teams involved in the games, the numbers that worry the NBA the most are the
fact that merchandise sales were down forty-two percent for the 2004-05 sea-
son.
2 8 1
As the system existed before the new eligibility requirement, the excep-
tional basketball players from high school entered the NBA, and the
good/average high school players became college players. The quality and ex-
citement of both games suffered.282 The NBA has an obligation to market an
exciting product, and by allowing younger players with raw, underdeveloped
talent to enter the NBA, the league is in effect lowering its current skill level.
283
Presently, the NBA benches are not as deep as they have been in the past.
284
The benches are now filled with younger players that teams draft in hopes of
developing as future superstars,285 and these younger players have been publicly
blamed for the decrease in the league's shooting percentage.286 Playing com-
petitive college basketball is where these young athletes learn essential basket-
ball skills, not on the bench during the beginning of their NBA careers. 287 Nor-
mally, an NBA rookie does not receive much playing time during the season
and is usually forced to develop during practice, but because practices are "short
279 Rudy Martzke, No Slowing Declining Ratings for NHL, NBA, USA TODAY, June 4, 2003, at
2C.
280 Chris Isidore, Star-Free Finals are Hurting the NBA, CNN Money,
http://money.cnn.com2005/06/10/commentary/column-sportsbiz/sportsbizl (last visited Feb. 7,
2006).
281 Id.
282 In 2004, the ratings of the NCAA men's championship game of Connecticut versus Georgia
Tech was the all-time low since the tournament went to prime time games in 1973. Rudy
Martzke, CBS Says NCAA a 'Success' Despite Ratings Dive for Final, USA TODAY, Apr. 7, 2004,
at 2C. Interesting to note however, even though this was lowest rated game in the NCAA's his-
tory, it was still more than Game One of 2005 NBA finals. See Isidore, supra note 280.
283 Kerr, supra note 12.
284 Id.
285 For example, in 2003 the Detroit Pistons selected Darko Milicic with the second pick in the
draft. Milicic was only eighteen years old when drafted and only played 5.8 minutes per game
during the first two years of his career. Player Profile, YAHOO SPORTS,
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/players/3705 (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). A look of the rest of the high
school basketball players, with the exception of LeBron James and Amare Stoudamire, shows that
they perform mediocre at best during their first two seasons in the league. See McCann, supra
note 257, at 184.
286 Oates, supra note 253.
287 Kerr, supra note 12.
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and relatively easy '288 the players try to improve their skills by playing "2-on-2
with other substitutes. 289
The owners and general managers take chances on players that are un-
proven, all in hopes of finding the next Kobe Bryant, Tracy McGrady, or Kevin
Garnett. 290 This has caused teams to increase their scouting, and it occasionally
proves to be ineffective.291 While there is no way to ensure that requiring bas-
ketball players to be in college for three years before becoming eligible for the
NBA means that all picks would prove efficient, some analysts feel the more
time the athlete spends in college the more time the NBA scouts can evaluate
their talent.292 Also, in the cases where the player drafted out of high school is a
bust, it costs the team several millions of dollars.293 More time in college would
allow the teams a better chance to evaluate potential players.294
Furthermore, it is evident that the NBA has taken steps in the past in at-
tempt to keep its product exciting. Over the years, the league has introduced
several changes to the game such as implementing the shot clock, changing its
policy on defense, and instructing its referees to call games tighter.295 These
changes have been all in an attempt to increase scoring.296 While it is hard to
argue that the art of the mid-range jump shot has been lost, it is obvious that
despite the NBA's efforts to increase scoring, the average number of points
scored in an NBA game has drastically decreased throughout the years. 297 The
three teams with the highest scoring averages in NBA history averaged nearly
125 points per game.298 In the 2004-05 season, the Phoenix Suns were the high-
est scoring team in the NBA, but only averaged 110.4 points per game.299 In the
past eight years, the 2004-05 Suns were the only team in the NBA to average
288 Id.
289 id.
290 Mannix, supra note 13.
291 See Greg Sandoval, High School Starts Rushing to the NBA, WASH. POST, May 5, 2004, at
DOI (stating "travel and labor costs have risen as NBA scouts are obliged to canvass the country
for the top high school talent").
292 Chris Lawlor, NBA Give Last Call to High Schoolers, USA TODAY, June 29, 2005, at 9C
(ESPN Analyst Jay Bilas stated, "I don't think they went far enough, meaning they should have
made it 20 (years old) for business reasons .... Draft picks are valuable commodities and the
more information you have on prospects, the better decision you're going to make.").
293 Ganderson, supra note 222, at 25.
294 See Id. at 3.
295 Pete Alfano, NBA's Anemic Effort; Low Scoring Trend Has Hurt the Game, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, June 13, 2004, at 01C.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 NBA Regular Season Team Records, at http://www.basketball.con/nba/records/NBAteam-
RegScore.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
299 NBA Sortable Stats, at http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/stats/byteam? catl=Total&cat2=
team&sort=232&conference=NBA&year=season_2004 (last visited March 25, 2006).
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more than 110 points per game. 300 Because some athletes did not play college
basketball and entered the NBA directly from high school, their talent was unre-
fined and underdeveloped. 30 ' By agreeing to an eligibility requirement similar
to that of the NFL, and forcing the physically talented high school athletes with
raw basketball skills to develop those skills in college for more than one year,
the NBA would increase its skill level, which would likely lead to more points
per game and a better product for the fans.3 °2
Another aspect of this argument is that professional sports are "win
now" businesses.3 °3 And contrary to the NBA, NFL first round draft picks (with
the exception of quarterbacks in some cases) usually make immediate impacts at
the professional level.304 Given the "win now" attitude in the NBA, it is diffi-
cult to say that coaches need to win immediately, but general managers admit
that they are drafting underdeveloped players based on raw potential. 30 5 These
two philosophies simply do not compliment one another.
30 6
Besides the depreciation in the quality of skill at the NBA level, another
reason the NBA should adopt an eligibility requirement like the NFL is because
fans recognize star power.3° Star power is what attracts viewers and fans to
watch games and spend their money.30 8 Star power is built when players are
exposed to the average fan and begin to build a fan base because they become
recognizable.3°9 With the exception of LeBron James and Amare Stoudemire,
most of the other outstanding high schoolers took several years to develop.310
As a result, these players are spending their younger years on the bench, and
while it is true that they are making millions of dollars, they are not contributing
substantially to their team. The NBA would be better served from a marketing
standpoint to have its fans recognize its players. With more teams, and the
300 Single Season Team Stats, at http:/www.basketballreference.com/leaders/teamseason-
search.htm (last visited March 25, 2006).
301 Kerr, supra note 12; Mannix, supra note 13 ("The result is too many fundamentally chal-
lenged might-have beens rotting on NBA benches and otherwise bogging down the game.").
302 Kerr, supra note 12.
303 See Mark Maske and Leonard Shapiro, The Formula for Success; Stability at Coach, Smart
Spending, Luck are Essential to Building a Winner, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2004, at DOI; Associ-
ated Press, Cavaliers Fire Silas in Midst of PlayoffPush, WASH. POST, March 22, 2005, at D05.
304 See generally Joe Menzer, A Cold Draft: Panthers' Picks From 2005 Draft Show Little Sign
Before Being Able to Contribute, WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, Oct. 9, 2005, at C12.
305 Nance, supra note 254, at IA.
306 K.C. Johnson, Cartwright Faces "Dilemma"; Winning While Developing Kids a Difficult
Task, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 2002, at N3.
307 Isidore, supra note 280.
308 Id.
309 See generally SHERRI L. BURR & WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FILM, TELEVISION, AND, Music 644 (Thomson West 2004) (explaining the impor-
tance of star power in the entertainment industry).
310 See McCann, supra note 257, at 225; Nance, supra note 254, at IA.
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growth of foreign and high school players, the average NBA fan does not know
the majority of players in the league.311 Based on the principle of "mere expo-
sure" developed by Psychologist Robert Zajonc in 1968, several studies have
shown that "the mere repeated exposure to an object suffices to increase one's
liking for it."'312 Therefore, by giving the average fan more time to become fa-
miliar with a player during his college years, that player (and the NBA) would
develop more of a fan base.313 Because of the "mere exposure" concept, the
publicity that players would have on television, in the newspapers, and maga-
zines would increase the fans' liking of those players and consequently, the
teams and the league for which they play. In addition to the "mere exposure"
concept, the players, teams, and the league would also gain the support of play-
ers' college's alumni.314 While in college, students and alumni follow their
players to the professional level. This gives athletes who go to college for three
or four years much more of an initial fan base. 315 For these reasons, an eligibil-
ity requirement like the NFL's, would give the NBA and the media the opportu-
nity to use college basketball as a tool to expose players to the average fan, and
thus allow players to develop public recognition before entering the NBA, con-
sequently improving both the league's and players' marketability.
In addition to these two reasons, the NBA's eligibility requirement is
only a step in the right direction because the NBA has a responsibility to ensure
that its players are mentally and physically able to handle life in the league.
Another point made in McCann's article is that by excluding high school play-
ers and college underclassman from the NBA draft, the NBA would be acting
blatantly paternalistic. 316 But the NBA is a business, and it must look out for its
business interests, and that includes ensuring that its incoming rookies are pre-
pared, both mentally and physically. Not only are these eighteen and nineteen
311 Ryan Clark, Americans Brace for Foreign Invasion, WASH. POST, June 21, 2003, at DOI
(discussing "the draft of anonymity," with the average fan able to name only the players all but
guaranteed to be the first three picks).
312 ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 283 (MIT Press 2001) (citing
Robert Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, 9 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPHS, 9, 1-27 (1968)).
313 This Note would hate to play the role of a "homer," but this theory is demonstrated by what
transpired with the West Virginia University men's basketball team in the 2005 NCAA Tourna-
ment, especially junior power forward Kevin Pittsnogle. "[A]fter the NCAA tournament...
people knew me." Dan Wetzel, What's in a Name?, YAHOO! SPORTS, https:/sports.yahoo.com
/ncaab/news?slug=dw-rt_05_day4_wal&prov =yhoo&type=lgns (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). The
exposure and popularity of the NCAA tournament is an excellent opportunity for players to adver-
tise their skills, in order to develop that important star power.
314 See CNN Morning News, http://transcripts.cnn.comTRANSCRIPTS/0601/07/smn.01.htm
(last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
315 For example, the University of Texas and Vince Young have about 400,000 alumni. Texas'
Title Has Registers Bleeding Orange, at http://www.sportspageweekly.conarticle/arti-
cles/72/l/Texas%92-title-has-registers-bleeding-orange.
316 McCann, supra note 257, at 178.
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year old athletes expected to compete against future hall of fame players at a
young age on the court, but also they are expected to act like adults off the
court, when in fact they are far from being adults. Kwame Brown is an excel-
lent example of a young high school player who was faced with difficulties on
and off the court.3 17 Brown was selected with the number one pick of the 2002
draft by Michael Jordan and the Washington Wizards.318 His raw potential was
undeniable, he was six foot eleven inches, lightning quick, and was well built.319
But he was only nineteen years old, and had no idea what life was like in the
NBA.320 There are stories of Brown eating Popeye's fried chicken for breakfast,
lunch, and dinner because he did not know how to shop for groceries.32'
As discussed above, older players in the NBA have cited incidents of
immaturity by younger players, on and off the court, as their reason for hoping
322to see an age limitation. These NBA players are faced with challenging deci-
sions and situations at a young age.323 The young athletes are given enormous
amounts of money, scrutinized by the media, exposed to tremendous amounts of
pressure, but are expected to act like adults. Very rarely will high school play-
ers be expected to deal with these types of experiences. Therefore, the NFL's
eligibility requirement is designed to help college players become exposed to
tremendous amounts of pressure, play in front of large audiences, and also assist
in the transition from high school to college. And although college players are
faced with similar problems, they enjoy more resources to help them adjust to
324e
this type of environment and prepare them for life on their own. It may be
downright paternalistic, but when given the opportunity to have its future play-
ers groomed for life as a professional basketball player, the NBA should have
fought for a stricter eligibility requirement.325 The NBA has a legitimate inter-





322 Povtak, supra note 15.
323 Bill Frakes, What Would You Do?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 31, 2005, at 56.
324 See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Association, www.ncaa.org (last visited Feb. 9,
2006). See also West Virginia University Athletics Student Services,
http://www.wvu.edu/-sports/services/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2006).
325 One can argue that the NBA's developmental league allows players to be groomed before
entering the league and earn money. The developmental league allows players drafted immedi-
ately out of high school to play for a minor league team. This system would be very similar to
what is in place in Major League Baseball. In baseball, it is common for high school athletes to be
drafted straight out of high school and play several seasons in the minor leagues. The National
Basketball Development League would likely expand from the current number of teams, six, to
approximately fifteen, then each NBDL team would serve as a farm club for two NBA teams.
Kerr, supra note 12; see also Official Site of the National Basketball Developmental League,
http://www.nba.com/nbdl/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). This may not be as successful as Major
League Baseball has been because the scenario in basketball is extremely different. As opposed to
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est in making sure these young players are more mature when they come into
the league.
Finally, another reason the league wanted an eligibility requirement is
because the NBA has an interest in looking out for the best interests of its
league: not only by offering an exciting product, but also by promoting a re-
spectable image.326 Commissioner Stem voiced his opinion on an eligibility
requirement because he does not want to be a part of a league that is sending its
scouts (or even worse-agents) to tenth and eleventh grade high school games.327
However, because of the extensive scouting that needs to be done, one year in
college will not supply NBA scouts with the information needed to make such
an important decision. Therefore, Stem's concern may be addressed slightly,
but scouts and agents will still be at high school games. An eligibility require-
ment similar to the NFL's would allow scouts (and agents) enough time to
evaluate a player while in college and not in high school.
VII. CONCLUSION
One can only imagine what professional basketball would have been
like for the past thirty-five years had the Supreme Court not allowed Spencer
Haywood to enter the NBA in 1971 .328 Now one can only imagine what the
NFL would have become had the Second Circuit allowed Maurice Clarett to
play professional football in 2004. Whatever the results may have been, the
NFL is currently enjoying enormous success. 32 9 This success has proven to
benefit the league, its players, and the fans. Following the 2004-05 NBA sea-
son, the NBA realized that it needed to improve its product in order to share
similar success to that of the NFL. In an effort to do so, the NBA changed its
eligibility requirement to no longer allow high school players to enter the draft.
Even though the NBA did increase its eligibility requirement, it was not enough
college baseball, there is vast media attention and popularity that accompanies college basketball,
and if young players were required to play in the developmental league before reaching the star
status of the NBA, it would be foreseeable that athletes would opt for college because of the ex-
tensive media exposure as compared to a developmental league forum. College basketball players
are seen on national television, while NBDL players play on small stages such as Huntsville,
Alabama and Asheville, North Carolina. See McCann, supra note 257, at 189. "CBS will pay the
NCAA an average of $564 million per year (or $6 billion total) to broadcast 'March Madness,' the
NCAA's marquee college basketball tournament." Id. at 189-90.
326 Chris Tomasson, Stern Keeps Eyes Fixed on Future of the NBA, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Feb. 11, 2005, at 7C. According to Sports Illustrated columnist Jack McCallum, at a gathering of
seventy-five high school basketball players, he asked the question "How many of you like the
NBA better than you like college basketball?" According to McCallum, one individual raised his
hand. The reasons given were "NBA players don't try as hard as the college players, NBA game is
too slow and boring, I don't like the players all that much anymore." This is not the type of image
Commissioner Stern wishes to portray. McCallum, supra note 243.
327 Alesia, supra note 259, at ID.
328 See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
329 See supra note 239.
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to make a significant difference in the league's product. The NBA has a sub-
stantial interest in promoting an exciting high-quality product. Therefore, while
the NBA's new eligibility requirement that prohibits high school players from
entering the NBA draft is a step in the right direction, the NBA should have
implemented an eligibility requirement similar to that of the NFL. A one-year
out of high school requirement will simply not make a meaningful difference.33°
The reasons the NBA should have mirrored its eligibility requirement after the
NFL's rule are because such a rule would lead to better quality of play, an in-
crease in the players' and the league's marketability, players that are mentally
and physically more mature, and the promotion of a more respectable image.
Because of this change, it may only be a matter of time before a high
school player is declared ineligible to play college basketball and, instead of
playing in the NBDL, attempts to sue the NBA for entrance into the league's
draft. Even though courts have articulated different tests to interpret applicable
antitrust law, a high school athlete who attempts to challenge the NBA's eligi-
bility requirement, would likely lose the suit because the NBA learned from
Clarett and included its eligibility requirement into its CBA and would thus pass
both the Second and Eighth Circuit's tests. The only real issue for the court to
determine is whether or not an eligibility requirement is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. Thus, if a district court agrees with the district court in
Clarett and several other academics who felt the Second Circuit was incorrect,
and finds for the high school player, the Supreme Court may have to resolve
such an issue. If such a case does reach the Supreme Court, the Court would
likely rule that federal labor policy demands the nonstatutory exemption ap-
ply,331 and the Court could shed some light on the various questions regarding
the nonstatutory exemption as it applies to sports eligibility requirements.
Kevin J. Cimino*
330 Stephen Cannella, Cleaning House, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 11, 2005, at 28.
331 See supra Part V.
* Executive Research Editor and Executive Committee Member, Volume 108 West Virginia
Law Review; J.D. Candidate May 2006, West Virginia University College of Law; Bachelor of
Science in Law and Justice, The College of New Jersey, 2003. I would especially like to thank
Eric Silkwood, Wes Page, Dave Fusco, and Christine Reagan for their time and attention to detail
during the preparation of this Note (and Jeff Pekar for being able to answer any question I had
without looking it up). I would also like to thank Professor cummings and R. Cordell Pierce for
their direction and comments. Without their assistance, this Note would have never been pub-
lished. Also, I would like to extend my gratitude to Professors Roberts and Wright for their sup-
port and guidance throughout my three years at the College of Law. I thank Dr. Henry F. Fradella
for introducing me to the importance of legal research and writing. Katy, you've made these last
three years a lot easier than they should have been. I was lucky to have had you here. To my
brothers, Neal and Patrick, you guys have always been there to play wiffle ball, wrestle, or just
talk fantasy football. Finally, Mom and Dad, you were at every game, answered every phone call,
told me the way it was, and because of that you made me the person I am today. Thank you.
2006]
41
Cimino: The Rebirth of the NBA - Well, Almost: An Analysis of the Maurice
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2006
42
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 13
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss3/13
